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We estimate the impact on pilgrims of performing the Hajj pilgrimage to
Mecca. Our method compares successful and unsuccessful applicants in a lottery
used by Pakistan to allocate Hajj visas. Pilgrim accounts stress that the Hajj leads
to a feeling of unity with fellow Muslims, but outsiders have sometimes feared
that this could be accompanied by antipathy toward non-Muslims. We ﬁnd that
participation in the Hajj increases observance of global Islamic practices, such as
prayerandfasting,whiledecreasingparticipationinlocalizedpracticesandbeliefs,
such as the use of amulets and dowry. It increases belief in equality and harmony
among ethnic groups and Islamic sects and leads to more favorable attitudes
toward women, including greater acceptance of female education and employment.
Increased unity within the Islamic world is not accompanied by antipathy toward
non-Muslims. Instead, Hajjis show increased belief in peace, and in equality and
harmony among adherents of different religions. The evidence suggests that these
changes are likely due to exposure to and interaction with Hajjis from around the
world, rather than to a changed social role of pilgrims upon return.
I. INTRODUCTION
We take advantage of a lottery used by Pakistan to allocate
visas for the Hajj pilgrimage to understand the impact of the Hajj
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on pilgrims’ attitudes, beliefs, and practices. Our work sheds light
on contemporary concerns regarding Islamic orthodoxy and ex-
tremism by showing that although the Hajj increases observance
of orthodox Islamic practices, it also increases the desire for peace
and tolerance toward others, both Muslims and non-Muslims. Our
study also contributes to a broader literature on theories of social
interaction and social identity and on the role of religious institu-
tions.
During ﬁve speciﬁc days of each year, more than two million
Muslim men and women from over one hundred different coun-
tries gather in Mecca for the Hajj, often staying for over a month.
Pilgrims mix across the lines of ethnicity, nationality, sect, and
gender that divide them in everyday life. They afﬁrm a common
identity by communally performing identical rituals and dressing
in similar garments that emphasize their equality.
Numerous pilgrim accounts suggest that the Hajj inspires
feelings of unity with the worldwide Muslim community (Wolfe
1997). Malcolm X performed the Hajj after breaking from the het-
erodox Nation of Islam to become a Sunni Muslim. In a letter from
Mecca, he wrote, “There were tens of thousands of pilgrims, from
all over the world. ...W ew e r ea llp a r tic ip a tin ginth esa m er itu a l,
displayingaspiritofunityandbrotherhoodthatmyexperiencesin
America had led me to believe never could exist between the white
a n dn o n - w h i t e ....[ W ] h a tIh a v es e e n ,a n dexperienced, has forced
me to rearrange much of my thought-patterns previously held,
andtotossasidesomeofmypreviousconclusions”(X1965,p.346).
Some have worried, though, that by promoting greater unity
among Muslims, the Hajj could have negative implications for
non-Muslims. After it emerged that some of the July 7 bombers
of the London public transport system had undertaken the Hajj,
the British intelligence services began monitoring pilgrims (Sun-
day Times 2007). Historically, colonial authorities also expressed
similar concerns regarding the Hajj (Bose 2006; Low 2007).
Others have expressed concern that the Hajj promotes a par-
ticular type of Islam. For example, Naipaul (1981) laments what
he sees as the erosion of local religious traditions in South Asian
Islam in favor of a more Saudi or Arab version of Islam.
Of course, it is difﬁcult to isolate the causal impact of the
Hajj based on examples such as those of Malcolm X or the July 7
bombers.ThosewhochoosetoundertaketheHajjdifferfromthose
who do not, and the choice to do so may reﬂect other life changes.
Thus, changes in pilgrims’ views and behavior after the Hajj mayESTIMATING THE IMPACT OF THE HAJJ 1135
notreﬂectitsimpact.WeestimatetheeffectofperformingtheHajj
by comparing successful and unsuccessful applicants to a lottery
Pakistan uses to allocate its limited supply of Hajj visas. Because
our survey included 1,600 Pakistani Sunni Hajj visa applicants
and was conducted ﬁve to eight months after the completion of the
Hajj, our results should be interpreted as isolating the medium-
term impact of performing the Hajj on this particular population.
Our results support the idea that the Hajj helps to integrate
the Muslim world, leading to a strengthening of global Islamic
beliefs, a weakened attachment to local religious customs, and a
sense of unity and equality with others who are ordinarily sepa-
rated in everyday life by sect, ethnicity, nationality, or gender, but
who are brought together during the Hajj. Although the Hajj may
help forge a common Islamic identity, there is no evidence that
this is deﬁned in opposition to non-Muslims. On the contrary, the
notions of equality and harmony appear to extend to adherents
of other religions as well. These results contrast sharply with the
view that increased Islamic orthodoxy goes hand in hand with
extremism.
We ﬁnd that Hajjis (those who have performed the Hajj) are
more likely to undertake universally accepted global Muslim re-
ligious practices such as fasting and performing obligatory and
supererogatory (optional) prayers. In contrast, the Hajj reduces
performance of less universally accepted, more localized prac-
tices and beliefs such as using amulets and the necessity of giv-
ing dowry. For example, the Hajj increases regular prayer in the
mosque by 26% and almost doubles the likelihood of nonobligatory
fasting. At the same time, it reduces the practice of using amulets
by 8% and the South Asian belief according lower marriage prior-
ity to widows than to unmarried women by 18%.
The evidence suggests that the Hajj increases tolerance both
within the Islamic world and also beyond it. Hajjis return with
more positive views toward people from other countries. Hajjis are
also more likely to state that various Pakistani ethnic and Muslim
sectarian groups are equal, and that it is possible for such groups
to live in harmony. These views of equality and harmony extend
to non-Muslims as well: Hajjis are 22% more likely to declare that
people of different religions are equal and 11% more likely to state
that adherents of different religions can live in harmony.
Wealsoﬁndevidence thatHajjisaremore peacefully inclined.
For example, although few in our sample are willing to condemn
the goals of Osama Bin Laden openly, Hajjis are almost twice as1136 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
likely to do so. Hajjis are also more likely to express a preference
for peace with India and are 17% more likely to declare that it is
incorrect to physically punish someone who has dishonored the
family.
ThereislittleevidencethatparticipatingintheHajjincreases
support for an increased role of religion in the state or politics, or
that it induces negative views of the West. Hajjis are in fact less
likely to believe that the state should enforce religious injunctions
and that religious leaders should be able to dispense justice. Ha-
jjis and non-Hajjis report similar views regarding the adoption of
Western values and on the plausibility of Western/Jewish roles in
the September 11 and July 7 terrorist attacks.
The feelings of unity and equality brought about by the Hajj
extend across gender lines to an extent. Hajjis report more posi-
tive views on women’s attributes and abilities. For example, they
are 6% more likely to think women are spiritually better than
men, an increase of over 50%. They also express greater concern
about women’s quality of life in Pakistan relative to other coun-
tries and about crimes against women in Pakistan. Hajjis are also
more likely to support girls’ education and female participation in
the professional workforce. Hajjis show an 8% increase in their de-
clared preference for their daughters or granddaughters to adopt
professional careers. Male Hajjis show changes in views similar to
those of female Hajjis. However, not all views on gender change. In
particular, Hajjis are no more likely to question Islamic doctrine,
such as unequal inheritance laws across gender, or to express
views that potentially challenge male authority within the house-
hold, such as the correctness of a woman divorcing her husband.
This suggests that Pakistani Hajjis’ altered views on women re-
ﬂect a movement away from local prejudices against women and
toward fairer treatment within Islam, rather than a more general
trend toward feminism.
Hajjis, primarily women, report lower levels of emotional and
physical well-being. This may be due to the physically taxing na-
ture of the Hajj rituals, as well as changed beliefs and greater
awareness of the Muslim world outside Pakistan, particularly for
women.
Contrary to some of the historical literature on the Hajj (cf.
Azarya [1978]; Donnan [1989]; Yamba [1995]), we do not ﬁnd ev-
idence in our sample of major changes, at least in the medium
term, in the social role or engagement of Hajjis after their return.ESTIMATING THE IMPACT OF THE HAJJ 1137
Althoughourstudycannotdeﬁnitivelydeterminewhatdrives
the impact of the Hajj, further evidence suggests that the results
are not driven by changes in pilgrims’ social roles upon return but
rather reﬂect changes the pilgrim experiences during the Hajj,
particularly exposure to Muslims from around the world. Hajjis
gain experiential knowledge of the diversity of Islamic practices
and beliefs, gender roles within Islam, and, more broadly, the
world beyond Pakistan. Although the Hajj effects could be driven
by a change in religious commitment, we do not ﬁnd that Hajjis
acquire greater formal religious knowledge. The Hajj’s impact on
experiential knowledge and on some tolerant attitudes toward
other groups tends to be larger for those traveling in smaller
groups, who are more likely to have a broad range of social inter-
actions with people from different backgrounds during the Hajj.
Hajjis also show the largest positive gain in their views of other
nationalities in relation to Indonesians, the non-Saudi group they
are most likely to observe during the Hajj. Hajjis’ changed views
toward women may also reﬂect an exposure channel, because the
Hajj offers Pakistani pilgrims a novel opportunity to interact with
members of the opposite gender in a religious setting, and to
observe cross-gender interactions among Muslims from nations
more accepting of such interactions.
Our results shed light on contemporary concerns about Is-
lamic orthodoxy and extremism. For many in the West the link
is apparent: 45% of Americans believe Islam is more likely to en-
courage violence than other religions and close to one-third use
negative words such as fanatic, radical, and terror to describe
their impressions of Islam (PEW Forum 2007). It is noteworthy
that although the Hajj leads to greater religious orthodoxy, it also
increases pilgrims’ desire for peace and tolerance toward others,
both Muslims and non-Muslims.
Our results also connect to a broad, longstanding literature
on social interaction and the shaping of beliefs and identity. Lab-
oratory experiments suggest that group interactions exacerbate
conﬂict in competitive settings and lessen it in cooperative ones
(DeVries and Slavin 1978; Stephan 1978; Johnson and Johnson
1983; Aronson and Patnoe 1997; Slavin and Cooper 1999; Petti-
grew and Tropp 2006). Drawing on a particular real-world setting,
Boisjoly et al. (2006) report evidence that exposure to African-
American roommates generates more positive attitudes toward
African-Americans among white students. In contrast, Fisman
et al. (2008) ﬁnd that exposure to a different race in youth makes1138 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
individuals less likely to prefer that race for a potential mate as
adults. Although social identity theory suggests that strength-
ening attachment to an in-group may lead to negative feelings
toward an out-group (Sherif et al. 1954; Tajfel 1970; Tajfel and
Turner 1986), our evidence shows that Hajjis also positively up-
date their views both toward groups to which they were exposed
to and those they were not.
Our ﬁndings also relate to a question in the sociology and
economic modeling of religion about why religions often incor-
porate individually costly practices, and more broadly about the
impact of religion on development (Iannacone 1992; Glaeser and
Glendon 1998; Berman 2000; Sacerdote and Glaeser 2001; Barro
and McCleary 2003; Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2003). Putnam
(2007) suggests that, in the U.S. context, religion may play a par-
ticularly important role as a “glue” that builds social capital. Our
results suggest that the Hajj may play a role in contributing to the
survival of Islam as a uniﬁed world religion. Over time, religions
with far-ﬂung adherents tend to evolve separate strands. Absent
a central hierarchy in Islam, the Hajj may help bind the Islamic
world together by moving Hajjis toward a common set of practices,
making them more tolerant of others, and by creating a stronger
shared identity.
Further work would be needed to determine the extent to
which our ﬁndings generalize beyond the speciﬁc context we ex-
amine. Our survey, conducted ﬁve to eight months after the Hajj,
captures medium-term effects. Although it remains open whether
these effects persist, we ﬁnd few changes over the survey period.
Further examination is also needed to determine the extent to
which the results generalize beyond our sample of Pakistani Hajj
lottery applicants. For example, the impact of the Hajj on gender
attitudes may be smaller for pilgrims from countries with more
liberal gender views. To the extent that the gender results reﬂect a
convergence to the mean views of Hajjis, the Hajj may even induce
more conservative views for pilgrims from these countries. More-
over, nearly half of lottery applicants are illiterate. Although this
is fairly representative of Pakistan and a large number of Muslim
countries, results could differ in more educated societies. Finally,
we assess the impact of the Hajj using survey questions, several of
which elicit self-reported beliefs and opinions. Additional work is
needed to determine how the Hajj would impact pilgrims’ actions.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II gives some background on the Hajj, focusing on aspects thatESTIMATING THE IMPACT OF THE HAJJ 1139
contextualize our ﬁndings. Section III lays out our statistical ap-
proach, outlines aspects of the visa application process that are
important for our identiﬁcation strategy, and gives details of the
survey.SectionIVpresentsthemainempiricalresultsonreligious
practice and belief, tolerance, gender, and well-being. Section V
explores potential channels for the observed effects. Section VI
concludes with some underpinnings and broader implications of
our results.
II. THE HAJJ EXPERIENCE
The pilgrimage to Mecca is one of the ﬁve pillars of Islam
and is obligatory for those with sufﬁcient ﬁnancial means. Many
Hajjis describe it as the most signiﬁcant religious event in their
lives. Although the Hajj rituals last ﬁve days, many pilgrims stay
longer. Most of the Hajjis in our sample report spending 40 days
worshipping in the cities of Mecca and Medina.1
The Hajj is an inherently communal experience, in a religion
that gives particular importance to communal rituals (McCleary
2007). Each ritual component of the Hajj is performed simultane-
ouslywithovertwomillionparticipants.Thefocusisonindividual
practice rather than building religious knowledge. Moreover, each
participant’s performance is believed to reinforce the others’, pro-
viding a shared aspect to individual worship.
The Hajj engenders substantial mixing across national,
sectarian, and gender lines in an atmosphere that emphasizes
equality and unity. Pilgrims’ common identity is afﬁrmed through
common dress—a simple white garment known as the ihram—
and the communal performance of standardized ritual practices.2
Men shave their heads, making them more similar in physical
appearance, and those who complete the Hajj are entitled to use
the honoriﬁc Hajji/Hajjin as a preﬁx to their name, further em-
phasizing their common identity.
Although opportunities for in-depth intergroup interactions
are limited both by language barriers and by the housing of pil-
grims with their compatriots, the group nature of the experience
makes observations of the contrasting practices and social dynam-
ics of other groups even more salient. Close to two-thirds of the
1. See the Appendix for a timeline of the Hajj and an outline of the rituals
and activities.
2. Men wear two white sheets. Women face less stringent requirements but
typically also wear white.1140 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
Hajjis in our survey reported interacting with people from other
countries frequently during the Hajj.
The Hajj also involves more gender mixing than is typical
among the Pakistani pilgrims we study. In Pakistan, interaction
between men and women who are strangers is uncommon. Women
rarely go to the mosque and when they do, they typically pray in a
separate area from men. With equal numbers of male and female
Hajjis (Bianchi 2004), such gender interactions are a natural part
of the Hajj. Parties of pilgrims stay and move together for ease
of planning and safety, and often include non–family members.
Men pray alongside women, both Pakistani and non-Pakistani,
during the Hajj. Our qualitative interviews revealed that these
experiences were both very salient and unusual for Hajjis, and
that most viewed them positively.
Finally, Hajjis are also exposed to a degree of religious diver-
sity within the recognized schools of thought, in a religiously sanc-
tioned context in which all are accepted. The fourteenth-century
Muslim explorer Ibn Battuta noted that because followers of dif-
ferent schools of Islam prayed together at Mecca, this often led to
mixing of religious practices (Ibn Battuta 2002 [1355]).
The Hajj is physically and ﬁnancially taxing. Pilgrims travel
over 80 km, much of it typically on foot. The extreme congestion
heightens risks of injury and infectious disease (Ahmed, Arabi,
and Memish 2006). Hajjis typically also sacriﬁce rest in order to
maximize prayers during their stay. Participants in Pakistan’s
Hajj lottery system pay about US$2,000 each for the trip, roughly
two and one-half times Pakistan’s 2006 per capita GDP. The me-
dian respondent in our survey saved for the Hajj for over four
years.
III. METHODOLOGY:T HE HAJJ LOTTERY AND SURVEY
Because those who choose to perform the Hajj are likely to
be motivated by a wide spectrum of unobservable and potentially
time-varying factors, such as religious commitment and the desire
for spiritual transformation, it is difﬁcult to measure the impact
of the Hajj by comparing Hajjis and non-Hajjis. We address this
by taking advantage of a lottery that allocates Hajj visas. Because
successfulandunsuccessfullotteryapplicantsareexanteidentical
in expectation, we can use the lottery outcome as an instrument
forwhethersomeoneperformstheHajjandisolatetheHajjimpact
from potential confounding factors. This section provides detailsESTIMATING THE IMPACT OF THE HAJJ 1141
of the Hajj lottery, our statistical methodology, and our survey
process.3
III.A. The Hajj Lottery Process
Historically, overcrowding on the Hajj has created logistical
and safety problems. Saudi Arabia, on whose territory the Hajj
takes place, therefore has established quotas for the number of
Hajj visas available for each major Islamic country. For the Jan-
uary 2006 Hajj that we study, Pakistan’s total quota was 150,000
visas. Ninety thousand visas were allocated by the government,
the majority (89%) by randomized lottery and the remainder by
special quotas for the military and civil service (Organization of
the Islamic Conference 2007). Applicants submitted a short form
and deposited the Hajj fee at one of 1,559 bank branches across
Pakistan between July 20 and August 15, 2005. The remaining
60,000 visas were allocated by private tour operators. As most
Pakistanis are not eligible for the special quotas and the private
operators are typically more expensive, the lottery is the primary
source of visas for most Pakistanis. A total of 134,948 people were
part of the government lottery with 59% successful.4
The Hajj lottery is conducted over parties of up to 20 indi-
viduals who will travel and stay together during the pilgrimage.5
Parties are formed either voluntarily, often along family lines, or
by staff of the bank branches. Parties are assigned into separate
strata for the two main Islamic sects (Sunni/Shia), eight regional
cities of departure, and two types of accommodation that vary
slightly in housing quality. A computer algorithm selects parties
randomly from each stratum until the quota of individuals for
that stratum is full. This process leads to a slightly lower chance
of success for larger parties; if the selected party is larger than the
remaining quota, it is set aside and another is randomly chosen
from the remaining pool.
The lottery selection algorithm was designed and imple-
mented by an independent and reputable third party, and there
were no reports of lottery manipulation. The rich and connected
typically go through a private Hajj tour operator or the special
3. See Clingingsmith, Khwaja, and Kremer (2008) for a fuller description.
4. Excluding applicants automatically given visas because they applied un-
successfully in the two preceding years.
5. In our survey sample, 34% of applicants were in a party with fewer than
ﬁve people (only 1% were in a party of one), and 70% were in a party with ten or
fewer people. The remaining 30% were in groups of size eleven to twenty.1142 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
quota rather than participating in the Hajj lottery. Consistent
with the hypothesis of random assignment, success in the Hajj lot-
tery is individually and jointly uncorrelated with applicant char-
acteristics listed on the Hajj application forms, such as gender,
marital status, year of birth, education, branch of application,
and whether applicants listed a telephone number. A joint F-test
fails to reject the null hypothesis of random assignment with a
p-value of .98 (Table I, Panel A). With observations on 134,948
Hajj applicants, if the lottery were subject to inﬂuence, one would
expect signiﬁcant differences by characteristics such as education
level, so this offers a pretty strong test.
Among the successful Hajj applicants we surveyed, 99% went
on the Hajj. Some unsuccessful lottery applicants secure a place
with a private Hajj operator or through the special quota. Thus,
11% of those who were unsuccessful in the government lottery
still performed the Hajj that year.
Because compliance with the lottery is not perfect, we use
success in the lottery as an instrumental variable to estimate the
effect of performing the Hajj. This yields the local average treat-
ment effect (LATE) for those for whom the outcome of the lottery
determines Hajj participation. Our estimation equation is
(1) Yk
i = αk + βkHajji + λc + εk
i ,
where Hajji is an indicator variable for whether individual i per-
formed the Hajj, Yk
i is the kth outcome of interest, and Hajji is
instrumented by the individual’s lottery status. As long as suc-
cess in the Hajj lottery only affects outcomes by inducing appli-
cants to undertake the Hajj, this provides unbiased estimates of
βk. Although we have no explicit way of ruling out a direct lot-
tery effect, it seems unlikely, because our survey period was 8 to
11 months after the lottery. Potential direct effects, such as dis-
appointment at not receiving a visa, are likely to be short-lived,
especially given that individuals reapply. Moreover, such an effect
would likely have led unsuccessful individuals to report greater
distress, whereas we will show evidence to the contrary.
Equation (1) also includes stratum-by-party size cell ﬁxed ef-
fects λc, as the randomization was done within strata and there
were slightly different chances of success depending on party size.
However, because quotas for each departure city were propor-
tional to the number of applications and the chance of success
varied only slightly with party size, results are similar withoutESTIMATING THE IMPACT OF THE HAJJ 1143
TABLE I
RANDOMIZATION CHECKS
Panel A Panel B
Success in Success in lottery
Success in lottery among among interviewed,
lottery interviewed restricted subsample
Applicant characteristic Coefﬁcient (SE) Coefﬁcient (SE) Coefﬁcient (SE)
Female −0.001 −0.017 −0.026
(0.004) (0.022) (0.024)
Application numbera 0.001 −0.003 −0.015
(0.003) (0.015) (0.016)
Travel party numbera 0.005 0.071 0.037
(0.006) (0.068) (0.072)
Year of birth 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Married 0.009 −0.017 0.006
(0.008) (0.063) (0.073)
Middle school −0.001 −0.019 −0.012
(0.005) (0.037) (0.041)
High school 0.000 −0.045 −0.050
(0.006) (0.046) (0.051)
Intercollege and up 0.002 −0.005 −0.006
(0.008) (0.052) (0.060)
Branch of applicationa 0.005 −0.004 0.000
(0.009) (0.042) (0.000)
Provided phone number −0.001 0.080 0.094
(0.011) (0.060) (0.064)
Constant 1.142 −1.464 −2.481
(0.264) (2.499) (2.689)
Observations — 1,605 1,295
R2 .02 .06 .10
Joint F-test of individual .98 .89 .81
characteristics (p-value)
Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the party level. Regressions include dummies
for place of departure × accommodation category × party size category.
aApplication number is in units of 100,000; travel party number is in units of 10,000; branch code is in
units of 1,000.
∗Signiﬁcant at 10%.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at 5%.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at 1%.
the cell dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the party level,
because outcomes for people traveling together may not be inde-
pendent.
Both for ease of exposition and to lessen data-mining con-
cerns, we present our results using thematic indices that are con-
structed by grouping related questions. For example, for views on1144 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
female education, we construct an index that combines questions
about whether girls should receive education, what level of school-
ing girls should receive, etc. Although results on any component
question could potentially be due to chance (Type I error), this
is less likely when one simultaneously considers several related
questions in an index. Moreover, the use of indices reduces the
risk of low statistical power (Type II error). We compute the av-
erage effect size (AES) across outcomes (components) within an
index following O’Brien (1984) and Kling et al. (2004).6 For a
family of J related outcomes Y j in an index, with Hajj local aver-
age treatment effects πj, the average effect size is τ = 1
J
J
j=1
πj
σj ,
where σj is the standard deviation of outcome j in the comparison
group.7
We report standard tests of the null hypothesis of no effect for
each individual index. However, because we have 25 indices, we
also show that our results are robust to multiple hypothesis test-
ing by using a conservative Bonferroni–Holm test, which makes
no assumptions about the correlation of hypotheses. We can reject
the null hypothesis of one or more false positives with an α of 0.07.
Less conservative methods, such as specifying an acceptable false
discovery rate, would make this result even stronger.
III.B. The Survey
We surveyed successful and unsuccessful applicants to the
2006 Hajj lottery ﬁve to eight months after the Hajj.8 The survey
includes questions on religious knowledge and practice, tolerance,
views on gender, social interaction and roles, political involvement
and beliefs, physical and mental health, and business and employ-
ment, as well as background information on the household and its
members.
6. Results are similar with indices that average over component questions
(see the working paper version).
7. To test for τ against the null hypothesis of no average effect, we account for
the covariance between the effects πj by jointly estimating the πj in a seemingly
unrelated regression framework. We stack the J outcomes and use our treat-
ment effects regression fully interacted with dummy variables for each outcome
as the right-hand side. The coefﬁcients πj are the same as those estimated in the
outcome-by-outcome regressions. Our stacked regression now gives us the correct
covariance matrix to form a test of τ.
8. Conducting a baseline survey was infeasible because the lottery took place
less than a month after applicant data were available. Surveys after the lot-
tery would not constitute a valid baseline because the successful applicants were
preparing to leave and differentially affected.ESTIMATING THE IMPACT OF THE HAJJ 1145
TABLE II
SUMMARY STATISTICS
Adult Pakistani
population (restricted Restricted
> 20 years old) Full sample subsample
Characteristic Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
Age 40.16 16.244 54.575 13.240 55.039 13.246
Female 0.499 0.500 0.490 0.500 0.496 0.500
Married 0.703 0.497 0.943 0.232 0.948 0.222
Illiterate 0.482 0.458 0.402 0.490 0.417 0.493
Intercollege and up 0.201 0.43 0.178 0.383 0.157 0.364
Citya 0.400 0.490 0.372 0.483
Periurban/ 0.274 0.460 0.293 0.455
large villagea
Rurala 0.325 0.470 0.335 0.472
Ballot success 0.533 0.499 0.524 0.500
Monthly expenditures 8.678 0.641 8.832 0.783 8.896 0.726
(log)
Notes. N = 1,605 for full sample, N = 1,295 for subsample, and N = 29,995 for adult Pakistani population.
The Pakistani adult population is from the MICS 2003–4 survey (restricted to the same districts as in our
sample).
aCity, periurban, and rural classiﬁcations comparable to our survey data are not available in the MICS.
The initial sampling frame was the list of all Hajj lottery
applicants obtained from the Ministry. The survey area was lim-
ited for logistic ease to nine administrative districts in the Pun-
jab province.9 Surveyors used addresses and telephone numbers
provided in the applications to locate applicants and interview
them at their residences. The sample was also restricted to Sunni
applicants, because there were too few Shia applicants for mean-
ingful inferences to be drawn. To maximize statistical power, we
randomly selected equal numbers of winning and losing parties.
Within each party, we randomly selected an individual to inter-
view, and, if other party members of opposite gender were identi-
ﬁed as living with the individual, we also selected a second person
of the opposite gender.
Surveyed applicants are broadly representative of the adult
Pakistan population (Table II) with some truncation of the ex-
tremes of the socioeconomic distribution, because the poorest can-
not afford to go on the Hajj and the rich typically travel on private
schemes. Hajj applicants have average education and household
9. The districts were Attock, Islamabad, Rawalpindi, Jhelum, Chakwal,
Faisalabad, Sargodha, Multan, and Gujrat.1146 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
TABLE III
SURVEY COMPLETION STATISTICS
Panel A: Full sample Panel B: Restricted subsample
Lottery status Lottery status
Characteristic Total Successful Unsuccessful Total Successful Unsuccessful
Selected for 2,537 1,286 1,251 1,995 1,032 963
interview
Raw completed 1,605 855 750 1,295 679 616
interviews
Completion 63.3 66.5 60.0 64.9 65.8 64.0
rate (%)
Not completed (%)
Dead/ill 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.3 2.2 2.3
Lives elsewhere 10.4 10.0 10.8 9.8 9.8 9.8
Not found 8.3 6.4 10.3 7.7 6.6 8.9
Not home 7.9 8.7 7.2 8.2 8.7 7.6
Refused 7.9 6.3 9.6 7.2 6.9 7.5
Notes. Interview completion percentages from surveyor reports.
expenditures similar to those for the general population, but are
older and more likely to be married. Forty percent are from cities,
fairly similar to the general population.
Surveyors completed interviews with 1,605 applicants, 63%
of the 2,537 they attempted to interview (Table III, Panel A). How-
ever, only 7.9% of the attempted interviews were refused. In about
three-quarters of unsuccessful attempts, surveyors were unable to
contact or locate applicants. Some applicants lived in a different
(out-of-sample) district from the one provided in their application
address (often a relative’s address they wished to travel with),
and it was not logistically possible to survey them. In other cases,
addresses were incomplete or incorrect or the applicant was not at
home despite three separate attempts. Among applicants the sur-
vey team could contact (i.e., interviewed plus refusals), the survey
completion rate was therefore 88.8%.
Successful applicants completed the survey at a 66.5% rate,
higher than the 60.0% rate for unsuccessful applicants. This dif-
ference is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level (Table III, Panel
A). Hajjis were easier to locate, perhaps because their partici-
pation in the Hajj made them better known in their localities.
Successful applicants also had a slightly lower refusal rate, possi-
bly because they regarded the survey as being more pertinent for
those who had actually performed the Hajj.ESTIMATING THE IMPACT OF THE HAJJ 1147
The unbalanced interview completion between successful and
unsuccessful lottery applicants could potentially introduce selec-
tion and bias our estimate of the Hajj effect.10 Therefore, we pro-
vide three robustness checks against selection concerns. First,
Table I, Panel B, shows that for completed interviews, lottery
success is not individually or jointly correlated with observable
applicant characteristics. Second, our results are robust to demo-
graphic controls. None of our 25 index results qualitatively change
with controls for district, urban or periurban location, and indi-
vidual characteristics.11
Finally, we examine the robustness of our results to a re-
stricted subsample (Table II) that excludes nine out of the 49
tehsils (subdistricts) in our survey area that were particularly dif-
ﬁcult to survey. This subsample is balanced on survey completion
and reasons for noncompletion. It excludes tehsils with more than
25 selected applicants (tehsils with smaller samples may generate
imbalance mechanically) where the completion rate for successful
applicants exceeded that for unsuccessful ones by more than 7%.
This subsample contains 81% of the total interviews. Although
the completion rate was still somewhat higher for successful ap-
plicants (65.8% vs. 64.0%), we fail to reject the null hypothesis of
an identical completion rate with a p-value of .66. As in the full
sample, lottery success in the interviewed subsample is uncor-
related with applicant characteristics (Table I, Panel B). As our
results below show, there is no qualitative change in our estimates
in the subsample.
IV. MAIN RESULTS
This section presents our main results on the impact of the
Hajj. Sections IV.A–IV.D examine religious behavior and prac-
tices,tolerance,genderattitudes,andwell-being,respectively.Our
10. A selection effect would imply that the marginal surveyed successful ap-
plicant was less willing to give an interview (more uncooperative) and harder to
locate. This is because the initial randomization guarantees that successful and
unsuccessful applicants are distributed identically along any attribute. If selection
is introduced by, for example, successful applicants gaining incremental visibility
from traveling, then the marginal successful applicant found is slightly less well
known ex ante than the marginal unsuccessful applicant found. However, it is not
clear how such potential selection could generate several of our results, such as
a shift from localized to global practice or increased tolerance. If anything, one
may expect the opposite for the tolerance result, because selection implies that the
interviewed successful applicant is marginally less cooperative.
11. We can use additional data such as assets and expenditure from survey
data, and the results are robust to these as well. We prefer not to present these as
primary controls due to their potential endogeneity.1148 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
TABLE IV
RELIGION
AES coefﬁcients
Restricted
Base Controls subsample
(1) Regarded as religious 0.238∗∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗ 0.258∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.055) (0.061)
(2) Global Islamic practice 0.163∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.029) (0.033)
(3) Belief in localized −0.101∗∗∗ −0.094∗∗∗ −0.074∗∗
Muslim practices (0.032) (0.031) (0.035)
(4) Participation in localized −0.097∗∗ −0.097∗∗ −0.085∗
Muslim practices (0.046) (0.045) (0.052)
Notes. Columns give AES estimates for our base, control, and restricted subsample speciﬁcations. The
AES averages the normalized treatment effects obtained from a seemingly unrelated regression in which
each dependent variable is a question in the index. All regressions include dummies for place of departure ×
accommodation category × party size category, as well as dummies for each of the nine districts in the survey.
All results come from IV regressions where the instrument is success in the Hajj lottery. Standard errors in
parentheses clustered at the party level: Index component questions with number of components indicated
in parentheses: Index 1 (1): Do others regard you as religious? Index 2 (10): How frequently do you: pray, do
tasbih after prayer, pray in the mosque? Did you pray in the mosque last Sunday? Do you pray optional night
prayers? Can you read the Qu’ran? How frequently do you: read the Qu’ran? discuss religious matters? keep
fast during Ramadan? keep fast outside Ramadan? Index 3 (10): What is your general view of holy men? Do
you regard: visiting holy men as correct? visiting shrines? using amulets? doing a forty-day death ceremony?
participating in maulad mehﬁl (special religious gathering)? Do you believe that: a cap is required for prayer?
that dowry is mandatory? that widows have different priority in remarriage? that there can be intercession on
Judgment Day? Index 4 (4): Do you actively visit holy men? visit shrines? use amulets? participate in maulad
mehﬁl?
∗signiﬁcant at 10%; ∗∗signiﬁcant at 5%; ∗∗∗signiﬁcant at 1%.
powertodetectinteractioneffectsislimited,sowegenerallydonot
present interaction results, except in cases where we have strong
priors and reasonable power and consistency, as in the case of
gender. Our estimates capture the effect of the Hajj ﬁve to eight
months after pilgrims return. Although this limits our ability to
explore persistence of the effects, we do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant
changes over the survey period.
The rows of Tables IV–VIII present the average effect size
(AES) estimates for each index, including the control and re-
stricted subsample speciﬁcations. Because the results are very
similar, we focus on the base speciﬁcation. The component ques-
tionsineachindexaredescribedinthenotestothetables.TableIX
further presents results for several index component questions of
individual interest.Asupplemental OnlineAppendixpresents the
Hajj impact estimates and deﬁnition details for all the component
questions.ESTIMATING THE IMPACT OF THE HAJJ 1149
TABLE V
TOLERANCE
AES coefﬁcients
Restricted
Base Controls subsample
(1) Views of other countries 0.150∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
(2) Views of other groups 0.131∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗ 0.122∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
(3) Harmony 0.128∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
(4) Peaceful inclination 0.111∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
(5) Political Islam index −0.050 −0.044 −0.043
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
(6) Views of West 0.029 0.039 0.011
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Notes. See notes to Table IV. Index component questions with number of components indicated in paren-
theses: Index 1 (6): General view of people from other countries, positive to negative: Saudis, Indonesians,
Turks, African, Europeans, Chinese. Index 2 (3): How do members of the following groups compare to your
group: different sect? different religion? different ethnicity? Index 3 (4): Do you believe the following groups
can live in unity and harmony through compromise over disagreements: sects of Islam? religions? Pakistani
ethnicgroups?Doyoueverprayin amosque ofadifferent schoolofthought? Index4(8):Beliefinincorrectness
of: Osama’s goals? Osama’s methods? How important is peace with India for Pakistan? Should the current
India/Pakistan boundary be the permanent border if this leads to peace? Should Pakistan not support/only
partly support those ﬁghting the Indian government in Kashmir? How incorrect are: suicide attacks? attacks
on civilians in war? physical punishment of someone who dishonors family? Index 5 (5): Agree that: govern-
ment should enforce Islamic injunctions? religious leaders have right to dispense justice? religious leaders
should have direct inﬂuence on government? better for politicians/ofﬁcials to have strong religious beliefs?
religious beliefs important in voting for candidate? Index 6 (4): Is it bad for Pakistanis to adopt: Western
social values? Western technology? Believe there was Western/Jewish role in 9/11 and 2005 London bombing?
Believe West does not take into account interests of countries such as Pakistan?
IV.A. Religious Practices and Beliefs
Hajjis are 13% more likely to report they are regarded as re-
ligious persons, a one-fourth standard deviation increase relative
to the control group (Table IV, row (1)).
Three indices explore how the Hajj affects religious prac-
tice and belief. The ﬁrst measures global Islamic religious prac-
tice, meaning the performance of rites universally acknowledged
within the Muslim world. Questions, described in the notes to Ta-
ble IV, include the applicant’s observance of prayer, fasting, and
Qur’anic recitation, etc. The Hajj increases the global religious
practice index by 0.16 standard deviations (row (2)). This is a
fairly large effect, particularly because it reﬂects practice ﬁve to
eight months post-Hajj, and not the fervor of a recently returned1150 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
TABLE VI
GENDER
AES coefﬁcients
Restricted
Base Controls subsample
(1) Views toward women 0.120∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
(2) Women’s quality of life 0.158∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
(3) Girls’ education 0.092∗∗ 0.089∗∗ 0.097∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
(4) Women in workforce/professions 0.119∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
(5) Gender authority −0.005 −0.010 0.005
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Notes. See notes to Table IV. Index component questions with number of components indicated in paren-
theses: Index 1 (4): How do men and women compare: mentally/intellectually? spiritually? morally/ethically?
Are men and women equal? Index 2 (5): Opinion of quality of women’s lives in following countries/regions rela-
tive to Pakistan: Saudi Arabia, Indonesia/Malaysia, West. Think too many crimes against women in Pakistan:
overall? relative to men? Index 3 (5): Should girls attend school? Until what level would permit attendance at
coeducational schools for: girls? boys? Until what level should coeducational schools be allowed? How many
years should girls study relative to boys? Index 4 (3): Like daughters/granddaughter to work? Like a profes-
sional occupation for daughters/granddaughters? Good employment important for daughter/granddaughter-
in-law? Index 5 (7): Women better at managing daily affairs? Wives have equal say in deciding number of
children? Is it sometimes correct for: woman to divorce husband? marry against parents wishes? When jobs
scarce men should not have more right to one than women? Should daughter have equal inheritence share?
Do women count equally to men as witnesses?
pilgrim. The Hajj nearly doubled the rate of regular fasting out-
side of Ramadan (the obligatory month of fasting) to around 9%
and increased praying Tahajjud (supererogatory) prayers by two-
thirds (Table IX, rows (2) and (3)).
In most Muslim countries, there are a variety of Islamic tradi-
tions that are not as universally accepted as the global practices
examined above. Some of these are speciﬁc to particular coun-
tries or regions. The Hajj rituals highlight global practices. Local
practices might decline because they compete for time and atten-
tion with global practices, or because the Hajj induces a shift in
belief.
We ﬁnd evidence of an absolute shift away from local beliefs
and practices. Although most pilgrims initially have moderately
high levels of local beliefs, the Hajj leads to a 0.10–standard de-
viation reduction in an index of localized beliefs that are fairly
common in South Asia but not among Muslims globally (Table IV,
row (3)). Some practices, such as visiting the tombs of saints and
using amulets, have roots in local Suﬁ traditions. Others reﬂectESTIMATING THE IMPACT OF THE HAJJ 1151
TABLE VII
WELL-BEING
Panel A: AES coefﬁcients Panel B: AES
Restricted Main Male
Base Controls subsample effect interaction
(1) Rescaled K6 index −0.206∗∗∗ −0.206∗∗∗ −0.200∗∗∗ −0.369∗∗∗ 0.326∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.09)
(2) Positive feelings −0.109∗∗ −0.098∗∗ −0.079 −0.149∗∗ 0.079
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08)
(3) Index of satisfaction −0.010 0.006 0.011 −0.028 0.036
with life and ﬁnances (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.08)
(4) Self-rated physical −0.213∗∗∗ −0.219∗∗∗ −0.239∗∗∗ −0.320∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗
health (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.10)
Notes. See notes for Table IV. In addition, note that Panel A gives AES estimates for our base, control,
and restricted subsample speciﬁcations, whereas Panel B adds an interaction between Hajj participation and
a male variable to the base AES speciﬁcation. In Panel B, the instruments are success in the Hajj lottery for
the main effect and success interacted with male in the interaction speciﬁcation. Index component questions
with number of components indicated in parentheses: Index 1 (6) [rescaled, high value=less distress]: During
the past 30 days, how often did you feel: nervous? hopeless? restless or ﬁdgety? so depressed that nothing
could cheer you up? everything was an effort? worthless? Index 2 (5): During the past 30 days, how often
did you feel: relaxed and peaceful? content? joyous? How much pleasure do you take in life? Altogether, are
you very happy/not at all happy (four-point scale)? Index 3 (3): How satisﬁed with life as a whole are you
(ten-point scale)? How much room for improvement in your quality of life? How satisﬁed are you with ﬁnances
(ten-point scale)? Index 4 (2): How good is your physical health (four-point scale)? Have you been free of any
7+ day illness/injury in the past year?
local interpretation of Islamic doctrine, such as giving dowry (Is-
lam instead emphasizes mehr, where a man commits to pay his
wife in case of divorce) and what remarriage priority should be ac-
corded to widows. Whereas South Asian women often lose status
when their husbands die and have little prospect of remarriage,
in Islam a widow can readily remarry after a short waiting period.
TheHajjsimilarlyreducesanindexoflocalizedreligiousprac-
tice,relatedmainlytotheSuﬁtraditionsmentionedabove,by0.10
standard deviations (Table IV, row (4)). As we noted earlier, some
have expressed concern about the erosion of local South Asian tra-
ditions. We later present evidence suggesting that the Hajj does
not produce a shift in favor of a Saudi version of Islam but rather
a move toward the global mainstream.
IV.B. Tolerance
We ﬁnd that Hajjis display more positive views toward other
nationalities and social groups, have greater tolerance, and are
more peacefully inclined (Table V).1152 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
TABLE VIII
ENGAGEMENT AND EXPOSURE
AES coefﬁcients
Restricted
Base Controls subsample
(1) Socioeconomic engagement −0.002 −0.008 0.011
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
(2) Engagement in politics −0.011 −0.010 −0.024
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
(3) Formal knowledge of Islam 0.004 0.000 −0.003
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
(4) Diversity knowledge 0.146∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
(5) Gender knowledge 0.125∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
(6) Global knowledge 0.083∗∗ 0.086∗∗ 0.072
(0.04) (0.03) (0.05)
Notes. See notes for Table IV. Index component questions with number of components indicated in paren-
theses:Index1(15):Howfrequentlydoyouvisit:peopleinyourtown/village?peopleoutsideyourtown/village?
How frequently are you visited by: people in your town/village? people from outside your town/village? How
many times in the past year have close family/friends sought advice on: family matters? religious matters?
business matters? How many times in the past year have more distant family/friends sought advice on: family
matters? religious matters? business matters? Are you a member of following kinds of organizations: religious,
professional, school? Do you work as: an employee? for yourself? Index 2 (7): Did you vote in last election?
How interested in national affairs? Are you member of political party? Are you a member of a political or-
ganization? A social organization? How often do you follow national affairs? Do you have an opinion on how
politicians are handling national affairs? Index 3 (10): Name as many of the ﬁve pillars of Islam as you can.
Correct answer to: How many chapters in the Qu’ran? Can you recite favorite verse of the Qu’ran? What is
shortest sura of the Qu’ran? What is longest? How many suras are in the the Qu’ran? What is ﬁrst revealed
verse of the Qu’ran? Is method of prayer described in the Qu’ran? What is percentage required to be given
as Zakat (charitable tax)? How long must wealth be held for Zakat to be due? Index 4 (3): Correct answers
to: How many accepted schools of thought in Sunni Islam? Is a cap required for prayer? Is saying “talak,
talak, talak” sufﬁcient for legal divorce? Index 5 (8): Correct answers to: What was name of prophet’s ﬁrst
wife? How many wives is a man allowed at once? Can a Muslim man marry a Jewish or Christian woman? Is
dowry mandatory? Further: Have you heard of Islamic law relating to adultery? Do you have an opinion about
women’s lives in: Saudi Arabia? Indonesia/Malaysia? West? Index 6 (6): How many countries share a border
with Pakistan? What country has largest percentage Muslim? What percentage of Nigerians are Muslim?
What are world’s two most populous countries? Who is the Prime Minister of India? Which is further from
Pakistan, England or the United States?
The Hajj increases an index of positive views about people
from other countries by 0.15 standard deviations or more than
33% (Table V, row (1)). Hajjis update their beliefs most positively
about nationalities they are likely to interact with frequently. The
largest positive impact (0.32 standard deviations) is on views to-
ward Indonesians (Table IX, row (4)), the largest non-Saudi pil-
grim group and the one Hajjis report as observing the most. Hajjis
also have a 0.14–standard deviation more positive view of Saudis
(Table IX, row (5)). There is no effect on views of Europeans. Ha-
jjis are also signiﬁcantly more likely to declare that IndonesiansESTIMATING THE IMPACT OF THE HAJJ 1153
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are the best practitioners of Islam (regression not reported). In
follow-up open-ended interviews, Pakistani Hajjis also reported
positive interactions with Indonesians. For example, one older fe-
male Hajji said, “I had a very good experience with female Hajjis
from Indonesia. They would make space for me whenever I was
walking if I gestured for them to do so. One of them even gave me
Vicks VapoRub when she found out that I had the ﬂu.”
The Hajj also increases an index of beliefs that adherents of
different sects, ethnicities, and religions are equal by 0.13 stan-
dard deviations (Table V, row (2)). In contrast to the views on
different nationalities, the largest move toward equal status is for
people of a different religion (Table IX, row (6)), who would not be
encountered during the Hajj, as they aren’t permitted to attend.
Hajjis may thus be willing to extend their notions of tolerance
beyond the Muslim world.
Similarly, the Hajj increases an intergroup harmony index
by 0.13 standard deviations (Table V, row (3)). The index solicits
applicants’ views on whether people from different ethnic groups,
Islamic sects, and religions could live together in harmony in the
same society. It also includes a practice-based question about how
frequently the respondent prays in a mosque of a different school
of thought. The effect is largest for religion, about which the con-
trol group has the lowest belief regarding harmony (Table IX, row
(7)). The effect on the respondent praying in a mosque of a dif-
ferent school of thought is also large, almost doubling the control
group mean of 4.9% (Table IX, row (8)).
We complement the harmony index by exploring the extent
to which the Hajj leads to greater inclination to peace. The Hajj
increases a peaceful inclination index by 0.11 standard deviations
(Table V, row (4)). Examining some of the component questions,
we ﬁnd that the Hajj almost doubles the number of respondents
who declare that Osama bin Laden’s goals are incorrect, from
6.8% to 13.1%, and increases the fraction declaring his methods
incorrect from 16% to 21% (Table IX, rows (9) and (10)).12 The
Hajj increases the belief that peace with India is important from
91% to 96% (Table IX, row (11)). Hajjis are also 17% more likely
to say it is never correct to physically punish someone who has
dishonored the family (Table IX, row (12)). Although these results
12. Slightlymorethanhalfsayhisgoalsarecorrect;one-thirdsayhismethods
are correct; quite a few do not answer.ESTIMATING THE IMPACT OF THE HAJJ 1157
are consistent with becoming more tolerant, it is also possible that
the Hajj confers religious legitimacy on individuals that allows
them to more willingly express previously held views.
Onemightsuspectthatmoreorthodoxreligiouspracticecould
be associated with support for political Islam, which advocates
a closer relationship between religion and politics and which is
often associated with negative perceptions of the West. We see
no increase in belief either in the role of religion in politics or in
more negative views of the West. It is nonetheless possible that
increased tolerance tempers such desires and perceptions, if they
do in fact go along with increased orthodoxy.
The Hajj reduces support for political Islam, although the
effect is only weakly signiﬁcant at 15% (Table V, row (5)). The
political Islam index includes questions on how deeply religion
should be involved in politics. Although the average respondent
is likely to see a role for religion in matters of the state, Hajjis
are no more likely to do so in spite of an increased attachment
to global Islam. In fact, the Hajj signiﬁcantly reduces beliefs that
the state should enforce religious injunctions and that religious
leaders should be able to dispense justice on their own. The Hajj
does not lead to any increase in an index of negative attitudes
toward the West (Table V, row (6)) that encompasses views on
adopting Western social values and technologies and commonly
held suspicions toward the West. We can reject a negative effect
of one-twentieth of a standard deviation with 95% conﬁdence.
We ﬁnd no evidence that the Hajj affects the tails of the dis-
tribution of attitudes toward political Islam and views toward
the West. Moreover, although young people may potentially be
more susceptible to intolerance, the six tolerance indices exam-
ined don’t show any differential Hajj effect for younger pilgrims
(regressions not reported). If anything, the harmony index shows
a more positive effect for the young.
IV.C. The Hajj and Gender
We noted earlier that the Hajj may provide Pakistani pilgrims
with a novel opportunity in which men and women interact, per-
form rituals as equals, and observe the gender roles of other na-
tionalities. Perhaps on account of this, we ﬁnd that the Hajj causes
a 0.12–standard deviation increase in an index of questions about
the status of women relative to men along intellectual, spiritual,1158 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
and moral dimensions (Table VI, row (1)). The effect is largest on
the spiritual dimension, with an increase of over 50% (from 11%
to 17%) in belief that women are better (Table IX, row (13)). Hajjis
are also more likely to believe that, although there are gender
differences, women’s overall status is equal.
The Hajj also increases an index that captures awareness
of women’s quality of life issues in Pakistan by 0.16 standard
deviations (Table VI, row (2)). The index includes respondents’
ratings of women’s quality of life in other countries relative to
Pakistan. The largest effect is on the relative quality of life of
Indonesian/Malaysian women being higher, paralleling the pre-
vious results on views of other nationalities (Table IX, row (14)).
Interestingly, Hajjis show a greater increase in their views on the
relative quality of life of women in the West compared to Saudi
Arabia (Table IX, rows (15) and (16)). In addition, Hajjis are also
more likely to think that crimes against women are high, both on
an absolute scale and relative to crimes against men (Table IX,
rows (17) and (18)).
Do the more favorable assessment of women’s qualities and
the greater concern regarding their quality of life in Pakistan go
along with a changed view of the role women ought to take in
society? We construct three indices to explore the areas of girls’
education, women’s workforce participation and choice of profes-
sions, and the willingness to challenge the authority of men rela-
tive to women within the household and in social contexts (Table
VI, rows (3)–(5)).
The Hajj increases favorable views toward education for girls
by about 0.09 standard deviations (Table VI, row (3)). We ﬁnd
positive Hajj effects on all components except equal educational
attainment across gender. The Hajj increases the desire that
girls attend school from 93% to 96% (Table IX, row (19)). Hajjis
are 8% more willing to allow both their boys and girls to at-
tend coeducational schools at all levels (Table IX, rows (20) and
(21)).
Further, the Hajj increases an index of questions about
women’s workforce participation and profession choice by 0.12
standard deviations (Table VI, row (4)). The Hajj has a substantial
impact on each index component. For example, the Hajj increases
the fraction desiring that their daughters/granddaughters work
from 54% to 60% (Table IX, row (22)). Hajjis are also 12% more
likely to think it is important that their future daughter-in-law be
employed (Table IX, row (23)).ESTIMATING THE IMPACT OF THE HAJJ 1159
However, Hajjis’ more favorable views of women do not ex-
tend to challenging male authority in the household (Table VI,
row (5)). The Hajj has little or no impact on an index that in-
cludes questions regarding whether the respondent challenges
traditional attitudes on women’s roles in domestic matters, such
as fertility decisions and marrying against parental wishes, and
unequal Islamic rules on gender, such as those related to inher-
itance laws and providing ﬁnancial witness. This is perhaps un-
surprising given the greater authority and responsibility typically
accorded to men along several dimensions within Islam.
Nevertheless, the changed perceptions about gender roles do
seem to accompany changes in household behavior. The Hajj in-
creased the fraction reporting occasional marital disagreements
by 10 percentage points, a large increase relative to the compari-
son mean of 15% (regression not reported). Because most married
couples perform the Hajj together, it is not possible to separate
this effect by the respondent’s gender (because it reﬂects both
their own and their spouse’s Hajj impact).
Although sample size limitations do not readily allow us to
examine heterogeneity of the impact of the Hajj, nevertheless we
ﬁnd that only the girls’ education index shows a smaller increase
for men than women, who in any case already have close to 100%
agreement with the view that girls should be educated (regres-
sions not reported). In fact, the Hajj leads to somewhat larger
changes in the indices of views on women and quality of life for
male Hajjis than for female ones.
IV.D. Well-Being
Hajjis, primarily women, are more likely to report negative
feelings that suggest distress, and are less likely to report positive
feelings of well-being (Table VII, rows (1), (2), (5), and (6)). This
could potentially be due to the changes in Hajjis’ beliefs and frame
of reference discussed above (which the psychology literature sug-
gests can lead to stress), to ﬁnancial stress associated with the
cost of the Hajj, or to the impact of the Hajj on physical health.
Hajjis report somewhat higher distress, as measured by a ver-
sion of the K6 screening scale (Kessler et al. 2003).13 The index
aggregates respondents’ experience of six negative feelings in the
past month, which we rescale so that a higher value represents
13. We should caution that, to our knowledge, the K6 index has not been
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less distress. Although applicants had a low level of underlying
distress, the Hajj reduces the index by 0.21 standard deviations
(Table VII, row (1)). The Hajj also reduces an index of ﬁve positive
feelings by 0.11 standard deviations (row (2)). In the restricted
subsample, the Hajj effect drops slightly to 0.08 standard devia-
tions with a marginal signiﬁcance of 11%.
The increase in distress falls entirely on women (Table VII,
rows (5) and (6)). On both the rescaled K6 index and the posi-
tive feelings index, there is no signiﬁcant effect of the Hajj on
men. Increased distress might be due to the stark contrast be-
tween the typical Pakistani woman’s daily life and the relatively
greater equality and integration experienced during the Hajj. The
impact of the Hajj on gender attitudes suggests an increased
realization that the constraints and restrictions women are ac-
customed to in Pakistan may not be part of global Islam. The
literature in psychology (Crosby 1991; Lantz et al. 2005) sug-
gests that such changes in frame of reference can induce signif-
icant stress, although eventually the stress helps deal with the
change.
Although the Hajj has a negative impact on a female pilgrim’s
emotionalstate,itdoesnotaffectoveralllifesatisfaction,eitheron
average, or for women (rows (3) and (7)). We can reject a negative
effect on the index of life satisfaction of about one-tenth standard
deviation with 95% conﬁdence. Although we cannot rule it out, we
do not see much evidence for the hypothesis that the substantial
ﬁnancial expenditure required by the Hajj creates ﬁnancial stress
that accounts for Hajjis’ negative feelings. In fact, we can reject
the hypothesis that the Hajj has a negative effect of more than
one-twelfth of a standard deviation on the individual component
question about satisfaction with ﬁnances. The Hajj also does not
affect monthly household consumption expenditures or a measure
of household assets (regressions not reported). Our interviews re-
veal that most do not consider the pool of savings for the Hajj
as fungible; those unable to go keep these Hajj funds in order to
reapply in the future.
The Hajj leads to a 0.21–standard deviation reduction in an
index of physical health (Table VII, row (4)) that includes self-
reported physical health and illness/injury. Although the decrease
in self-perceived health could be due to a change in the reference
group for Hajjis from local people to those encountered from other
countries on the Hajj, it is not clear that this can account for the
doubling in reports of serious physical injury or illness.ESTIMATING THE IMPACT OF THE HAJJ 1161
The negative physical health effects are also stronger for
women (row (8)), suggesting that part of the negative effect of
the Hajj on women’s feelings of well-being could be explained by
poorer physical health.14 However, the negative point estimates
on men’s physical health are larger than the effect on the K6 index
(0.11 vs. 0.04 standard deviations), suggesting that the two do not
exactly co-move. Also, the coefﬁcient on Hajj lottery success in a
regression predicting the K6 index is similar whether or not one
controls for physical health, providing further suggestive evidence
that the channel for Hajj effects on emotional health is not simply
through physical health.
V. POTENTIAL CHANNELS
Although our methodology does not provide experimental
variation that isolates the potential channels through which the
Hajj may impact the pilgrim, we can offer some suggestive ev-
idence. We consider both external channels, which operate by
changing the environment a Hajji faces upon return, and internal
channels, which reﬂect changes in Hajjis’ beliefs and preferences.
We argue that the evidence points toward the importance of the
internal channel and, within that, to exposure to people of differ-
ing nationalities, sects, and gender.
V.A. External Social Environment
Historical accounts suggest that the Hajj confers social pres-
tige and legitimacy (Donnan 1989; Eickelman and Piscatori 1990;
Yamba 1995), although some anecdotal evidence suggests that
contemporary Hajjis no longer experience this increase in social
status(Scupin1982).Achangedsocialrolemaybringexpectations
for the changed behavior and beliefs that are reﬂected in our re-
sults. For example, Hajjis may be expected to be more religious,
and may practice more to fulﬁll that expectation. Alternatively,
increased religious legitimacy may allow Hajjis to express long-
standing opinions they have not expressed before, such as those
opposing Osama Bin Laden.
We ﬁnd no impact of the Hajj on an index of social status
and engagement (Table VIII, row (1)). The ﬁfteen components
include the frequency of social visits, the giving of advice, and
14. Negative physical health effects are not larger for older people.1162 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
membership in social organizations.15 We might further expect
social standing to be reﬂected in awareness of and engagement in
political affairs. In fact, we ﬁnd no impact of the Hajj on a political
engagement index (Table VIII, row (2)) that asks about voting,
interest in national affairs, political opinion, and membership in
political organizations.
It’s possible that the Hajj once led to a much greater change
in social roles than it does currently, and that the increased rate of
participation in the Hajj due to lower travel costs has reduced the
social prestige associated with completing the Hajj. In any case,
it does not seem likely that changes in the social role upon return
can account for the ﬁndings in the previous sections.
V.B. Internal State
The Hajj may alter an individual’s internal state, changing
beliefsandpreferences.Forexample,Hajjismayundergoachange
in religious commitment during the pilgrimage that increases or-
thodoxy in religious practice and leads them to greater tolerance
and belief in gender equity consistent with the Qur’an. Alterna-
tively, Hajjis’ increased tolerance and changed gender attitudes
may reﬂect their new exposure to people from different countries
and sects and to members of the opposite gender outside their
family. Although we cannot rule out the religious dimension, we
interpret the evidence as pointing more toward the increased ex-
posure to Muslims from around the world.
We ﬁnd that the Hajj does not increase an index of formal
religious knowledge (Table VIII, row (3)) but does increase indices
of experiential knowledge about diversity of opinion within Islam,
gender within Islam, and the world more broadly (Table VIII,
rows (4)–(6)). The changes in experiential knowledge point to the
importance of interaction with and observation of other groups.16
Furthermore, to the extent that a spiritual transformation and
change in religious commitment would be accompanied by a de-
sire to acquire greater religious knowledge, these results do not
suggest that such a change is a primary driver of the ﬁndings.
15. All except two component questions are not signiﬁcant even at the 20%
level (Online Appendix 5). These two show that Hajjis are slightly more likely
to have visitors from out of town, and slightly more likely to be self-employed
(p-values of .14 each). However, the magnitudes of these effects are small (5%
and 3%).
16. Although some of our results could be due to a generic effect of traveling
to a different country rather than the experience of the Hajj, it seems unlikely
this accounts for all of the results. For example, it is hard to see why a pure travel
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The Hajj increases the index measuring knowledge of diver-
sity within Islam by 0.15 standard deviations (Table VIII, row
(4)). Index components include questions on how schools of Sunni
thought differ, such as whether it is necessary to wear a prayer
cap. The index of gender knowledge and awareness, which com-
bines eight questions on gender and marriage in Islam and on
having an opinion on women’s issues, increases by 0.13 standard
deviations(TableVIII,row(5)).17 Similarly,Hajjisalsoshowanin-
crease of 0.08 standard deviations in the global knowledge index,
which reﬂects general awareness of the world outside Pakistan
(Table VIII, row (6)).18
Pilgrimswhotravelinsmallerparties,andthushavemoreop-
portunity to interact with non-Pakistanis, experience larger gains
in the diversity, gender, and global knowledge indices, as well as
in positive views of people from other countries. This is consis-
tent with the idea that the exposure channel is important. The
coefﬁcients on the interaction between the Hajj and small party
size are large and signiﬁcant at conventional levels for the gen-
der and global knowledge indices and for positive views of other
countries. The small-party interaction effects are 0.13, 0.14, and
0.14 standard deviations, respectively, with p-values of .07, .10,
and .06. Point estimates for the group size interaction on other
tolerance indices also point to a similar story. The interactions
are robust to including other demographic controls and their in-
teractions. However, we cannot rule out that unobservable differ-
ences between parties of different size are driving the interaction
effects.
We would expect Hajj effects to also be larger for those with
less prior exposure to situations similar to the Hajj. However,
very few respondents had previously traveled outside Pakistan,
which limits our power to test this interaction. There are a few
robust interactions with literacy and urban residence, though it
is unclear if these relate to the prior exposure that is relevant.
Althoughurbanapplicantsdoshowasmallerdecreaseinlocalized
beliefs and practices, the literate see larger gains in some of the
17. Four of the eight questions in the gender knowledge and awareness index
are about awareness rather than knowledge: whether the respondent has heard
of the Islamic law against adultery and whether they have an opinion on women’s
lives in three different countries. The Hajj has a somewhat smaller, but still signif-
icant, effect on a pure gender knowledge index that is constructed without these
questions.
18. We should note that this latter effect falls slightly to 0.07 standard devi-
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experiential knowledge measures, suggesting that literacy may
partly be picking up other factors such as ability to interact with
others. Because party size is often assigned by banks, and is thus
less likely to be correlated with unobserved factors, we prefer
focusing on it as a test of exposure.
Although Hajjis are also exposed to Saudi Arabia and its peo-
ple, we think this is unlikely to drive our observed effects. Only
the move away from localized religious practices seems consistent
with a Saudi inﬂuence. Saudi Arabia is generally less accepting
of other schools of thought and enforces strict gender segrega-
tion; Hajj impacts on gender views are more in line with the more
liberal attitudes in other Muslim countries.19
Our results thus suggest that Hajjis are likely to be inﬂu-
enced by the practices and beliefs of the typical pilgrim that they
encounter during the Hajj, with possibly greater salience to those
groups that are more visibly different or are regarded as better
in some way, such as in their behavior or organization (factors of-
ten mentioned in our interviews). Exposure may therefore induce
convergence of belief to the Islamic mean. To the extent that this
convergence is a signiﬁcant force, some of our results may differ
for pilgrims from other countries.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Our ﬁndings show that the Hajj induces a shift from local-
ized beliefs and practices toward global Islamic practice, increases
tolerance and peaceful inclinations, and leads to more favorable
attitudes toward women. This demonstrates that deep-rooted at-
titudes such as religious beliefs and views about others can be
changed and also challenges the view that Islamic orthodoxy and
extremism are necessarily linked. We conclude with some ten-
tative implications of our results on how social institutions help
shape individual beliefs and identity and, at a macro level, how
they may foster unity within belief systems.
19. A comparison of gender views across questions from the World Values
Surveys shows that Saudis indeed have more conservative gender views than
Pakistanis, whereas Pakistanis in turn are more conservative than Indonesians.
Fully 62% of Saudis believe a university education is more important for men than
women, compared to 24% of Pakistanis and 17% of Indonesians. Similarly, 34% of
Saudis do not think that both husband and wife should contribute to household
income, compared to 30% of Pakistanis and 15% of Indonesians.ESTIMATING THE IMPACT OF THE HAJJ 1165
The social psychology literature suggests that social interac-
tions can lead to either positive or negative feelings toward other
groups depending on whether the setting is competitive or coop-
erative. Several features of the Hajj may create a setting in which
the interaction among different groups helps build common pur-
pose and identity. It’s worth noting that other social institutions
also share such features with the Hajj. Consider medical educa-
tion,police/militarybasictraining,andinternationalpeacecamps.
Like the Hajj, participants in these institutions leave their every-
day environments and their restrictions on mixing across certain
lines, such as ethnicity and social class, to enter a setting in which
they collectively perform similar actions, often physically stren-
uous ones, which require cooperation from others. Furthermore,
participants in all these institutions accentuate their similarity,
often by taking on common dress or hairstyle during the experi-
ence and a common title afterward.
It also seems likely that the religious element of the Hajj
plays a role beyond providing a cooperative setting. For example,
Hajjis’ changed attitudes on gender appear to be circumscribed
by those norms broadly accepted in Islam. Further, it is plausible
that the religious context provides the legitimacy that makes it
acceptable foradherents toaltertheirviews.IfaPakistani woman
observes her Indonesian counterpart engaging equally with her
spouse without compromising her piety, she may also consider
it permissible to do so. If pilgrims see others praying somewhat
differently yet without interference in the holiest of Muslim
places, they may reason that some degree of religious diversity is
acceptable.
Our results also shed light on why religions often mandate
practices that are costly for individual adherents. Although club
good models that apply the framework of individual rationality,
as in Iannaccone (1992) and Berman (2000), deliver compelling
explanations, additional insights can be obtained using an evo-
lutionary framework in which institutions and prescriptions that
reinforce and propagate the religion’s beliefs and practices are
more likely to persist. By moving pilgrims toward the religious
mainstream, the Hajj may help Islam overcome an evolutionary
hurdle faced by world religions: maintaining unity in the face of
the divergence of practices and beliefs through local adaptations.
A number of religious institutions, including written holy texts
and central authorities, can help overcome this hurdle. Sunni1166 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
Islam lacks a central authority, and so the role of pilgrimage may
be particularly important.
However, achieving convergence and maintaining unity likely
require that there be limits to how much diversity is allowed. Too
diverse a group may make it difﬁcult to ﬁnd common ground and
too much variance in beliefs increases the likelihood that undesir-
able religious innovations will spread. It is therefore noteworthy
that although people of different faiths made the pilgrimage to
Mecca in pre-Islamic times (Armstrong 1997), its institutional-
ization with Islam’s emergence was accompanied by restricting it
to Muslims and disallowing non-Islamic practices that were once
elements of the pilgrimage.
Both the evolutionary and club good perspectives imply
that religions with practices that generate positive externalities
for other adherents, provided these are socially efﬁcient, are
more likely to persist by raising the attractiveness of being an
adherent. Historically, undertaking the Hajj may have created
positive externalities for other Muslims both through its effect
on tolerance and by facilitating economic trade and the diffusion
of economic, cultural, and scientiﬁc ideas (Bose 2006). Although
we ﬁnd little evidence of individual medium-term gains in
socioeconomic status and engagement in our sample, there is
clear evidence for a positive externality in the increased tolerance
toward others. Of course, given the signiﬁcant ﬁnancial and
health costs entailed in undertaking the Hajj, individuals still
need to be induced to participate. However, this can be done
through religious injunctions, sanctions, and rewards. The Hajj
is one of the ﬁve pillars of Islam and there is the belief that
performing it sincerely cleanses one of all sins.
Models of costly religious practices also often argue that these
practices signal commitment and screen out those who may free
ride on the religious community. Because individuals have al-
ready signaled such commitment by applying to the Hajj (less
than 1% withdraw), our comparisons between applicants are not
inﬂuenced by signaling effects. Our results therefore indeed cap-
ture a treatment effect. The fact that the Hajj has a direct treat-
ment effect is not surprising, because one would expect that were
it only serving a signaling function, it would decline in observance
relative to alternate practices that could screen just as well but at
a lower cost.
The ﬁndings in this paper also pose the question of whether
pilgrimages or central gatherings may foster such unity in otherESTIMATING THE IMPACT OF THE HAJJ 1167
belief systems, religious or otherwise, and conversely, whether
their absence increases susceptibility to schisms. The Kumbh
Mela, bringing together millions of Hindus every three years,
along with Catholic pilgrimages to Lourdes and Rome, may play
such a cohesive role. Nonreligious examples include national po-
litical conventions in the United States that may promote party
unity and exchange among delegates from different regions. Con-
versely, the split between Judaism and Christianity occurred
shortly after the destruction by the Romans of the Jewish tem-
ple in Jerusalem, which was a central gathering place, in the year
70 A.D. One may even conjecture whether the multiplication of
Protestant sects would have been muted had there been a central
holy site for pilgrimage among Protestants.
Further insights are likely to come from investigating the
impact of the Hajj over different durations and on pilgrims from
other countries that differ from Pakistan in their attitudes and
exposure, and the impact of other pilgrimages. Because several
other countries also allocate Hajj visas by lottery, it should be pos-
sible to use the same methodology. More generally, one could use
similar approaches to examine the impact of other institutions on
social identity. For example, one could use draft lotteries (Angrist
1990) to examine the impact of military service on social identity
or regression discontinuity designs to examine the impact of pro-
fessional training on beliefs and attitudes. Building up evidence
from a series of such studies would shed additional light on the
broader roles played by institutions, religious and nonreligious, in
the shaping of beliefs and identity and the evolution of ideologies
and belief systems.1168 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
A
P
P
E
N
D
I
X
:
O
U
T
L
I
N
E
O
F
T
H
E
H
A
J
J
P
I
L
G
R
I
M
A
G
EESTIMATING THE IMPACT OF THE HAJJ 1169
CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY
HARVARD UNIVERSITY
HARVARD UNIVERSITY, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, AND THE NATIONAL
BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
REFERENCES
Ahmed, Q. A., Y. M. Arabi, and Z. A. Memish, “Health Risks at the Hajj,” The
Lancet, 367 (2006), 1008–1015.
Angrist, Joshua, 1990. “Lifetime Earnings and the Vietnam Era Draft Lottery:
Evidence from Social Security Administrative Records,” American Economic
Review, 80 (1990), 313–336.
Armstrong, K., Jerusalem: One City, Three Faiths (New York: Ballantine Books,
1997).
Aronson, E., and S. Patnoe, The Jigsaw Classroom (New York: Longman, 1997).
Azarya, V., Aristocrats Facing Change: The Fulbe in Guinea, Nigeria, and
Cameroon (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978).
Barro, Robert, and R. M. McCleary, “Religion and Economic Growth across Coun-
tries,” American Sociological Review, 68 (2003), 760–781.
Berman, Eli, “Sect, Subsidy, and Sacriﬁce: An Economist’s View of Ultra-orthodox
Jews,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115 (2000), 905–953.
Bianchi, R., Guests of God: Pilgrimage and Politics in the Islamic World (Oxford,
UK: Oxford University Press, 2004).
Boisjoly, J., G. Duncan, M. Kremer, D. Levy, and J. Eccles, “Empathy or Antipathy?
The Consequences of Racially and Socially Diverse Peers on Attitudes and
Behaviors,” American Economic Review, 96 (2006), 1890–1906.
Bose, Sugata, A Hundred Horizons: The Indian Ocean in the Age of Global Empire
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).
Clingingsmith, David, Asim Ijaz Khwaja, and Michael Kremer, “Estimating the
Impact of the Hajj: Religion and Tolerance in Islam’s Global Gathering,” KSG
Working Paper RWP08-22, 2008.
Crosby, F., Juggling: The Unexpected Advantages of Balancing Career and Home
for Women and Their Families (New York: Free Press, 1991).
DeVries, D. L., and R. E. Slavin, “Teams-Games-Tournaments (TGT): Review
of Ten Classroom Experiments,” Journal of Research and Development in
Education, 12 (1978), 28–38.
Donnan, Hastings, “Symbol and Status: The Signiﬁcance of the Hajj in Pakistan,”
Muslim World, 79 (1989), 205–216.
Eickelman, Dale F., and James Piscatori, “Muslim Travellers: Pilgrimage, Mi-
gration, and the Religious Imagination,” in Comparative Studies on Muslim
Societies, Vol. 9, Barbara D. Metcalf, ed. (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1990).
Fisman, Raymond, S. Iyengar, E. Kamenica, and Itamar Simonson, “Racial Pref-
erences in Dating,” Review of Economic Studies, 75 (2008), 117–132.
Glaeser, E., and S. Glendon, “Incentives, Predestination and Free Will,” Economic
Inquiry, 36 (1998), 429–443.
Guiso, Luigi, Paola Sapienza, and Luigi Zingales, “People’s Opium? Religion and
Economic Attitudes,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 50 (2003), 225–282.
Iannaccone, Laurence R., “Sacriﬁce and Stigma: Reducing Free-Riding in Cults,
Communes, and Other Collectives,” Journal of Political Economy, 100 (1992),
271–291.
Ibn Battuta, Tuhfat al-Nuzzar ﬁ Ghara’ib al-Amsar (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub
al-’Ilmiyya, 2002 [originally published ca. 1355]).
Johnson, D. W., and R. T. Johnson, 1983. “The Socialization and Achievement
Crisis: Are Cooperative Learning Experiences the Solution?” in Applied Social
Psychology Annual, Vol. 4, L. Bickman, ed. (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1983).
Kessler, R. C., P. R. Barker, L. J. Colpe, J. F. Epstein, J. C. Gfroerer, E. Hiripi,
M. J. Howes, S-L. T. Normand, R. W. Manderscheid, E. E. Walters, and A. M.
Zaslavsky, “Screening for Serious Mental Illness in the General Population,”
Archives of General Psychiatry, 60 (2003), 184–189.1170 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
Kling,J.R.,J.B.Liebman,L.F.Katz,andL.Sanbonmatsu,“MovingtoOpportunity
and Tranquility: Neighborhood Effects on Adult Economic Self-Sufﬁciency
and Health from a Randomized Housing Voucher Experiment,” Princeton IRS
Working Paper 481, 2004.
Lantz, P., J. House, R. Mero, and D. Williams, “Stress, Life Events, and Socioe-
conomic Disparities in Health: Results from the Americans’ Changing Lives
Study,” Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 46 (2005), 274–288.
Low, Michael, Empire of the Hajj: Pilgrims, Plagues, and Pan-Islam under British
Surveillance, unpublished M.A. thesis, 2007.
McCleary, R. M., “Salvation, Damnation, and Economic Incentives,” Journal of
Contemporary Religion, 22 (2007), 49–74.
Naipaul, V. S., Among the Believers: An Islamic Journey (New York: Vintage, 1981).
O’Brien, Peter C., “Procedures for Comparing Samples with Multiple Endpoints,”
Biometrics, 40 (1984) 1079–1087.
Organization of the Islamic Conference, Report on the Seventeenth Islamic Confer-
ence of Foreign Ministers: Resolutions on Legal, Information, and Political
Affairs (http://www.oicoci.org/english/conf/fm/17/17%20icfm-political-en.htm,
2007).
Pettigrew, T. F., and L. R. Tropp, “A Meta-Analytic Test of Intergroup Contact
Theory,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 90 (2006), 751–783.
PEW Forum, “Public Expresses Mixed Views of Islam, Mormonism,” in Pew Fo-
rum on Religion & Public Life (http://pewforum.org/surveys/religionviews07/,
2007).
Putnam, Robert, “American Grace: The Changing Role of Religion in America,”
Presentation, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University,
Fall 2007 Faculty Research Seminar.
Sacerdote, B., and E. L. Glaeser, “Education and Religion,” National Bureau of
Economic Research Working Paper 8080, 2001.
Scupin, Raymond, “The Social Signiﬁcance of the Hajj for Thai Muslims,” Muslim
World, 72 (1982), 25–33.
Sherif, M., O. Harvey, B. White, W. Hood, and Carolyn Sherif, Intergroup Con-
ﬂict and Cooperation: The Robber’s Cave Experiment (Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1954).
Slavin, R. E., and R. Cooper, 1999. “Improving Intergroup Relations: Lessons
Learned from Cooperative Learning Programs,” Journal of Social Issues,5 5
(1999), 647–664
Stephan, W. G., “School Desegregation: An Evaluation of Predictions Made in
Brown v. Board of Education,” Psychological Bulletin, 85 (1978), 217–238.
The Sunday Times, “Terror Watch on Mecca Pilgrims,” January 21, 2007.
Tajfel, H., “Experiments in Intergroup Discrimination,” Scientiﬁc American, 223
(1970), 96–102.
Tajfel,H.,andJ.C.Turner,“TheSocialIdentityTheoryofInter-GroupBehavior,”in
Psychology of Intergroup Relations, S. Worchel and L. W. Austin, eds. (Chicago:
Nelson-Hall, 1986).
Wolfe, M., One Thousand Roads to Mecca: Ten Centuries of Travelers Writing about
the Muslim Pilgrimage (New York: Grove Press, 1997).
X, Malcolm, The Autobiography of Malcolm X, with Alex Haley (New York: Grove
Press, 1965).
Yamba, C., Permanent Pilgrims: The Role of Pilgrimage in the Lives of West African
Muslims in Sudan (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1995).This article has been cited by:
1. RIKHIL  R.  BHAVNANI.  2009.  Do  Electoral  Quotas  Work  after  They  Are
Withdrawn?  Evidence  from  a  Natural  Experiment  in  India.  American  Political
Science Review 103:01, 23. [CrossRef]